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The Link Between Ml and the
Monetary Base in the 1980s
INCE 1980, there have been several changes
in the Federal Reserve System’s reserve require-
ments that have altered the relationship be-
tween the money stock, Ml, and the monetary
base. ‘Fhe Monetary Control Act of 1980 (hence-
forth, MCA) brought all depository institutions—
member and nonmember commercial banks,
saving and loan associations, mutual savings
banks and credit unions—under a uniform set
of reserve requirements and removed reserve
requirements on a broad category of savings
time deposits that are close substitutes for
checkable deposits. In February 1984, the Fed-
eral Reserve switched from lagged reserve ac-
counting to contemporaneous reserve
accounting.1
This article shows how these changes affected
the relationship between the money stock and
the monetary base, arguing that, under fairly
general conditions, the relationship should have
become less variable since 1980. Evidence con-
sistent with this argument is then presented.
CHANGES IN THE MONEY SUPPLY
PROCESS SINCE 1980
A simple model of the money supply process
provides a useful framework to illustrate how
the link between Ml and the monetary base has
changed in the 1980s. This model is summar-
ized by the following equation:
(1) Ml = mMB,
where Ml denotes the stock of money consis-
ting of checkable deposits and currency held by
the non-bank public; MB denotes the stock of
the monetary base consisting of total reserves
and currency; and rn represents the money
multiplier.
The money multiplier, which translates fluc-
tuations in the monetary base into fluctuations
in Ml, depends on the reserve requirements
that the Federal Reserve imposes on depository
institutions and a number of ratios that reflect
portfolio decisions of both depository institu-
‘The Fed moved from contemporaneous to lagged reserve
accounting in 1968.
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tions and the public (see the appendix for de-
tails and verification of the claims made in the
text). For a given set of portfolio preferences
and reserve requirements, equation 1 shows
what level of Ml will result from any given
level of the monetary base.
The ratios that reflect portfolio preferences of
depository institutions and the public generally
are not constant. As a result, even if reserve re-
quirements were unchanged, variation in these
ratios would produce variability in the money
multiplier. The MCA was intended to strengthen
the link between Federal Reserve actions and
changes in the money stock by reducing or
eliminating specific sources of variability in the
multiplier.
Unjform Reserve Requirements for
Member and State”Ghartered
ivonmember Banks
The MCA imposed uniform reserve require-
ments on all depository institutions. Before
1980, reserve requirements on deposits of state-
chartered nonmember banks were established
by the state in which they were domiciled.
These requirements were generally lower than
those imposed by the Federal Reserve. More im-
portantly, while only vault cash held by these
institutions was part of the monetary base,
checkable deposits held by these institutions
were included in MI.2
Without uniform reserve requirements on
checkable deposits, the multiplier would change
as deposits shifted between member and non-
member banks. For example, as checkable de-
posits flowed from member to nonmember’
banks, reserves would be released so that a
larger money stock could he supported by the
same level of the monetary base. That is, the
multiplier would increase. The opposite would
occur when deposits flowed from nonmember
to member banks. With uniform reserve re-
quirements, such shifts in checkable deposits
are no longer a source of variation in the
multiplier.
The same reasoning applies to shifts of time
and savings deposits between nonmember and
member banks. Before the MCA, as these
deposits flowed from member to nonmember
banks, reserves were released that could sup-
port a larger volume of checkable deposits.
Other things the same, the multiplier would
fluctuate as time and savings deposits shifted
between member and nonmember banks. Again,
uniform reserve requirements established by
the MCA removed this source of variation.
Extending Reserve Requirements
to Th,jfts
The MCA also extended the same set of re-
serve requirements to deposits at thrift institu-
tions, thereby removing another source of varia-
tion from the multiplier. Before 1980, these
institutions were not subject to the Fed’s reserve
requirements and checkable deposits held at
these institutions, called NOW accounts, were
not included in Ml. In February 1980, however,
Ml statistics were revised to include interest-
bearing checking accounts held at thrifts and
the historical data were revised to reflect this
change.3 Consequently, shifts of checkable
deposits between thrifts and banks influenced
the money multiplier prior to the adoption of
the MCA. Now, deposit shifIs between thrifts
and banks can no longer be a source of varia-
tion in the money multiplier.
Before the nationwide introduction of interest-
bearing checking accounts on January 1, 1981,
however, thrifts did not hold a large amount of
NOW accounts.4 Accordingly, deposit shifts be-
2For a discussion of state reserve requirements, see Gilbert
and Lovati (1978) and Gilbert (1978).
3See Hafer (1980) for a detailed discussion of the redefini-
tion of the monetary aggregates. While the redefinition did
not change the aggregate level of the monetary base,
vault cash holdings of thrifts were moved from currency to
total reserves.
There were two other important definitional changes in
the aggregates in the 1980s. Starting in February 1980,
demand deposits of foreign commercial banks and official
institutions were excluded from Ml. In July 1981, non-
bank traveler’s checks were included in Ml. In both cases,
the Ml series was revised historically. The latter revision
introduces an additional source of variability in the
Mi-base relationship because non-bank traveler’s checks
are not reservable. Further, since foreign deposits are still
subject to reserve requirements, they absorb the base
even though they are no longer included in Mi.
4For example, as of December 31, 1979, the non-bank
depository institutions held only $4.2 billion in NOW
accounts.
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tween thrifts and banks may not have been an
important source of variation in the multiplier
prior to l98I.~
Elimination of Reserve Re-’
quirements on Savings and Time
Deposits
Before the MCA, the Federal Reserve imposed
reserve requirements of 3 percent on commer-
cial bank savings and time deposits.6 The MCA
eliminated reserve requirements on a broad
class of savings and time deposits (hereafter,
S&Ts).’ As a consequence, shifts between
formerly reservable deposits and non-reservable
time deposits no longer affect the multiplier. Of
course, shifts between currently reservable time
deposits and checkable deposits or non-
reservable time deposits remain a source of
variability in the multiplier. Hence, the elimina-
tion of reserve requirements on a broad class of
S&Ts does not guarantee that the variability of
the multiplier will be reduced.
The Gradual Implementation of
the MCA
Reserve requirement changes under the MCA
were phased in over several years. The ad-
justments for most nonmember banks and
thrifts occurred gradually over an eight-year
period. Beginning November 1980, these institu-
tions had to maintain only one-eighth of the re-
quired reserves they would eventually hold
when the act was fully implemented. Each suc-
cessive September until 1987 (when the phase-in
was completed), these institutions had to hold
an additional one-eighth of the target level of
required reserves.
Member bank reserve requirements generally
were reduced by the MCA.8 Starting November
1980, a seven-step phase-down began, with one-
fourth of the new reserve requirements being
implemented in November 1980 and one-sixth of
the remainder being implemented in six steps.
The full phase-down was completed on March
1, 1984. For member banks whose reserve re-
quirements were raised, the phase-in was im-
plemented in four steps, with one-fourth of the
increase being required in November 1980 and
one-fourth being met in each of the next three
Septembers.
Although member banks had completely ad-
justed to the new reserve requirements by
March 1, 1984, the full impact of the MCA on
the multiplier could not have emerged until the
phase-in was completed for all depository insti-
tutions—unless the effect of extending reserve
5Conversations with Board staff suggest that thrifts may
have held vault cash in excess of what would have been
required on NOW accounts. If, in effect, thrifts were
holding vault cash in the form of reserves against these
accounts as if they were member banks, a shift from de-
mand deposits in a member bank to a NOW account at a
thrift would have no effect on the multiplier using current
data. Prior to the revision of the monetary aggregates,
however, such a shift would have caused the money supp-
ly to decline with no corresponding change in the
monetary base. Consequently, it would have affected the
multiplier. Furthermore, prior to January 1, 1981, member
banks in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont
also issued interest-bearing NOW accounts that were not
included in the money stock at that time. Member banks,
however, were required to hold reserves against these
deposits. Nevertheless, a shift from a member bank NOW
account to a thrift NOW account would have left both the
money stock and the monetary base unchanged if thrifts
were holding vault cash as reserves against these
deposits.
It should be noted, however, that in both cases above,
the measured ratio of currency to either Ml or checkable
deposits would have changed before the redefinition of
money and the adoption of MCA. Nonetheless, the varia-
tion in the currency ratio would have been reflected in the
measured multiplier only in the first case.
6The actual system of reserve requirements was slightly
more complicated, as there were different marginal reserve
requirements on time deposits by total size of outstanding
deposits and by term to maturity.
1Specifically, the MCA imposed reserve requirements on
time deposits except some of those that have an original
maturity shorter than 3~/2years; shorter-maturity time
deposits that are transferable, or that are non-transferable
and owned by anybody excluding an individual person or a
sole proprietorship, are still subject to a 3 percent reserve
requirement.
8Prior to the MCA, a system of marginal reserve re-
quirements on transaction deposits varied with the deposit
size of the institution. For example, just before the im-
plementation of the MCA, the marginal reserve require-
ment on demand deposits more than $400 million was
16¼ percent, while that on deposits less than $2 million
was 7 percent. Hence, the money supply could change
relative to the base as transaction deposits shifted bet-
ween institutions of different size. By reducing the number
of tiers in the marginal system from five to two—that is,
by partially removing the marginal reserve requirement
system—the MCA reduced the importance of this source
of variability in the multiplier. Moreover, the new system
generally lowered reserve requirements to be maintained
against transaction accounts. Starting in November 1980,
the marginal reserve requirement was only 3 percent for
accounts less than $25 million and was 12 percent for ac-
counts in excess of $25 million. With the exception of
member banks holding balances of checkable deposits
between $25 million and $100 million, member banks were
subject to lower marginal reserve requirements on
checkable deposits.
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requirements to thrifts is quantitatively unim-
portant. Because of the nature of the phase-in,
the variability of the multiplier might not have
dropped sharply at any particular time during
the 1980s. Instead, MCA’s impact on the vari-
ability of the multiplier could have occurred
gradually throughout the transition period.
The Impact of the MCI4 on the
Level of the Multiplier
In addition to reducing the variability of the
multiplier, the MCA’s changes in reserve re-
quirements had divergent effects on the level of
the multiplier.~While higher reserve require-
ments for nonmember banks, thrifts and
some member banks reduced the multiplier, the
elimination of reserve requirements on a broad
class of S&,Ts for member banks and lower
reserve requirements for most member banks
increased it. The net effect of the MCA on the
size of the multiplier depends on the relative
magnitude of these effects.”
The Change to Contemporaneous
Reserve Requirements
In February 1984, the Fed changed its reserve
accounting procedures from lagged reserve ac-
counting (LRA) to contemporaneous reserve ac-
counting (CRA). Under LRA, depository institu-
tions were required to hold reserves during the
current reserve-maintenance period based on
the average of reservable deposits (both check-
able and time deposits) held during the prior
two weeks. Under CRA, required reserves for
the current reserve-maintenance period are
based more heavily on the amount of reservable
deposits in that period.”
The major reason for adopting CRA was to in-
crease the Federal Reserve’s control over the
money stock.” It could have increased or had
no effect on the variability of the multiplier.” If
it affected the multiplier’s variability, the level
of the multiplier also would have declined;
9For a given level of the monetary base, an expected in-
crease (decrease) in the money multiplier would imply an
increase (decrease) in the money supply. If the Fed
removes reserves from (injects reserves into) the system,
however, the money supply need not be affected by the
expected increase in the multiplier. Typically, changes in
the money supply produced by changes in the multiplier
as a result of reserve-requirement changes are largelyon-
set through open market operations. See Burger (1979).
“See footnote 8. As of September 30, 1978, large banks
held more than 48 percent of the total demand deposits
outstanding. The net effect of the MCA on reserve re-
quirements for all depository institutions on the phase-in
dates is shown in table 2 which lists all reserve-
requirement changes from 1973 to 1988.
‘1Strictly speaking, reserve requirements under CRA are not
completely contemporaneous. There is a two-day lag on
reserve requirements on transaction accounts and a
14-day lag on liabilities other than transaction deposits.
See Gilbert and Trebing (1982) for details.
12One of the main concerns about the effect of LRA on
monetary control was that LRA encouraged the Fed to
validate deposit creation of depository institutions.
Specifically, some observers argued that under LRA
depository institutions were free to create any desired
amount of the checkable deposits. The Fed would be forc-
ed to supply the necessary reserves two weeks later;
otherwise, there would be a sharp increase in the federal
funds rate.
At one level, this argument reflects a view that the Fed
might be more concerned with movements in the federal
funds rate than with its money supply objective. At another
level, however, it was frequently suggested—e.g.,
Laufenberg (1976)—thatLRA severed the contemporaneous
link between the money stock and the monetary base.
Thornton (1983), however, has shown that the link need
not be affected by the accounting procedure for reserve
requirements; a contemporaneous link between the money
stock and the monetary base could be maintained either
through depository institutions’ holdings of excess reserves
or through the currency-deposit ratio under LRA. von
Hagen (1987) arrives at a similar conclusion, but empha-
sizes the role of interest rate expectations under LRA.
Thornton (1984) provides some earlyevidence on the effect
of the move to CRA on the variability of money and in-
terest rates. Also, see Thornton (1982) for an analysis of
money stock control under LRA and CRA.
“While the contribution of the variance of the currency-
deposit ratio and the ratio of excess reserves to checkable
deposits to the variability of the multiplier both decline with
the adoption of CRA, the contribution of the variance of
the other ratios could get larger. The net effect on the
variance of the multiplier depends on the relative magni-
tude of these effects. Given the importance of the cur-
rency-deposit ratio, in particular, the variance of the
multiplier should decline with the adoption of CRA. This
conjecture depends on modeling depository institutions’
holdings of excess reserves as a proportion of their check-
able and time deposits. If this specification is inappropri-
ate, the only link between Ml and thebase would be
through the currency-deposit ratio. In this instance, the
variance of the multiplier would increase with the move to
CRA.
Also, if depository institutions hold excess reserves as a
buffer stock under CRA, there might be no change in the
variability of the multiplier. See Thornton (1983) for details.
Although it is not immediately obvious why depository in-
stitutions would behave that way, Tarhan and Spindt
(1983) provide some evidence that banks maintain excess
reserves as a buffer stock.
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otherwise, it would have no effect on the level
of the multiplier.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The multiplier is measured as the ratio of Ml
to the monetary base. The effects of reserve re-
quirement changes are reflected in the adjusted
monetary base, so that they are not reflected in
its multiplier. The effect of such changes are
not reflected in the source base, so they are re-
flected in the multiplier obtained using it. Be-
cause the above analysis abstracts from reserve
requirement changes, normally it would be pre-
ferable to use the adjusted monetary base to
construct the multiplier. The adjusted monetary
base can also yield misleading results, however,
because the ratio of reservable time deposits to
total checkable deposits appears in the adjusted
monetary base and not its multiplier after
November 1980.14 Removing this component
from the multiplier only after November 1980
biases the results toward finding a reduction in
the multiplier’s variance.”
Although the multiplier derived from the
source base does not suffer from this limitation,
it reflects reserve-requirement changes. The ef-
fect of such changes on the variability of the
multiplier before and after the MCA depends on
the frequency and magnitude of reserve-re-
quirement changes during the two periods. If
reserve-requirement changes were more fre-
quent or larger before the MCA, failure to
abstract from such changes produces results
that are biased in favor of seeing a reduction in
variability after the MCA. If they are less fre-
quent or smaller, the bias would be in the op-
posite direction.
The analysis presented here is carried out for
multipliers based on the adjusted monetary base
(mA) and the source base (m5) to see if the
results are affected by these factors. The data
are monthly and cover the period from January
1973 through December 1988.
The Level of the Multiplier
As noted previously, the net effect of the
MCA on the level of the multiplier is analytically
indeterminate. On one hand, extending reserve
requirements to nonmember banks and non-
bank depository institutions and increasing
reserve requirements for some member banks
cause the multiplier to fall. On the other hand,
the elimination of reserve requirements on a
broad class of S&,Ts and the reduction in re-
serve requirements for most member banks
cause the multiplier to rise. The effect of the
move to CRA is somewhat less indeterminate
analytically. If it had any affect at all, the
multiplier would decline.
Figure 1 shows the levels of the two multi-
pliers over the period. ‘I’he vertical lines corres-
pond to the initiation of the MCA and the adop-
tion of CRA. Both multipliers generally decline
from January 1973 through early 1980. Follow-
ing a sharp decline in early 1980 and a sharp
rise in mid-1980, the multipliers generally rose
until mid-1986 and declined thereafter. Al-
though both multipliers declined slightly during
1984, the beginning of the decline, especially for
the adjusted monetary base multiplier, predates
the adoption of CRA by several months. Relating
the behavior of the level of the multipliers to
the adoption of the MCA and CRA by direct in-
spection is complicated by the fact that the mul-
tipliers are influenced greatly by the “k-ratio,”
the ratio of currency to checkable deposits,
which changed markedly during this period.’°
The Effect of the MCA and the
Adoption of CRA on the Non’-
Currency Ratio Components of the
Multiplier
One can abstract from movements in the k-
ratio by obtaining a joint representation for the
other components. Each multiplier can be writ-
ten in the general form,
“See Gilbert (1987), especiallythe appendix, for adiscus-
sion of the revised adjusted monetary base.
“The strength of this conclusion is based on an implicit
assumption that the covariance between this and other
multiplier components is zero. If the covariance is nonzero,
the direction of the bias could be the opposite of that
stated in the text.
“For a discussion of the importance of the k-ratio and its
behavior during the i980s, see Burger (1988).
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(2) m = (I + k)f(z +
where ki sthe k-ratio and zi sacomposite of
the required reserve ratios and the other ratios
that reflect the portfolio preferences of deposi-
tory institutions and the public. Equation 2 can
be solved for z to yield
(3) z = (1 + k — mk)Jm.
This calculation of z is done for both mA and
m~the results are denoted respectively as ZA
and z~.
Figures 2 and 3 show the behavior of the
multiplier, the k-ratio and z for the adjusted
monetary base and source base, respectively,
over the full sample period. In both cases, z
declines following the adoption of the MCA,
although the timing of this descent does not
match precisely the implementation of the MCA.
The behavior of z~in the early to mid-1980s
was influenced greatly by the Federal Reserve’s
imposition and subsequent elimination of credit
controls.” Nonetheless, its decline through
February 1984 suggests that the elimination of
reserve requirements on many savings and time
deposits andlor the lowering of reserve re-
quirements for most member banks are the
dominant factors influencing the level of the
multiplier.’~z~declines markedly through
February 1984 and increases slightly thereafter.
The increase following the move to CRA is con-
sistent with the hypothesized effect of CRA, but
is so small that the move to CBA might not
have had an important impact on the level of
the multiplier. zA behaves similarly, except that
“The credit controls imposed new reserve requirements on
increases in credit card lending, on large-denomination
time deposits and on money market mutual funds. The
credit controls were imposed in March 1980 and removed
in July 1980.
“Actually, this observation is not too surprising. The
removal of reserve requirements on a large class of time
and savings deposits should have caused the multiplier to
increase significantly. Moreover, the Board’s estimates in-
dicate that the largest effect of reserve-requirement
changes for member and nonmember institutions on
reserves was through institutions that had their reserve re-
quirements decreased (see table 2).
1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 1988
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it continues to fall following the move to CRA.’9
Figures 2 and 3 reveal that much of the move-
ment in the multipliers is associated with move-
ments in the k-ratio. The dominant effect of the
k-ratio on the multipliers is particularly evident
for the source base multiplier after 1984, when
z5 hardly changed. Indeed, the decline in both
multipliers since mid-1986 is associated with a
rise in the k-ratio; it appears to be unrelated to
movements in z.
The effect of reserve-requirement changes on
the level of z~ is seen more clearly when the
data are differenced. The differences of zA and
z5, denoted AzA and Az3, respectively, are pre-
sented in figure 4. Beginning in 1980, there are
several pronounced spikes in Az5. The first two
are the large positive and negative spikes
associated with the introduction and subsequent
elimination of the credit controls. The next
seven large negative spikes are associated with
the important phase-in dates for the MCA for
member banks.
The presence of spikes in Az3 related to
reserve-requirement changes and their absence
in AZA attests both to the importance of the ef-
“The divergent behavior of zA and z,, especially after the
move to CRA, is difficult to explain. With the exception of
the ratio of reservable time deposits to checkable deposits,
changes in all other ratios should be reflected in the same
way in both measures of z. An increase in the ratio of
reservable time deposits to checkable deposits would
cause z3 to rise; because of the way that the adjusted
monetary base has been calculated since November 1980,
however, such an increase would have no effect on ZA. In
any event, the disparate movements in the z’s had a very
small effect on the multipliers; both multipliers have moved
together after February 1984.
It should be noted, that because z3 reflects the actual
level of reserve requirements while z,, reflects the average
level over some base period before November 1980 and
the marginal reserve requirement on transaction deposits
(12 percent) thereafter, z3 is larger than ZA until mid-1982
and is smaller thereafter. The level of z3 in recent years is
somewhat puzzling, however, because it is substantially
less than the marginal reserve requirement on transaction
deposits. Moreover, both measures suggest that the pro-
portion of the z’s not accounted for by reserve require-
ments is very small. Indeed, the excess reserve ratio and
the ratios of government and foreign deposits to total
checkable deposits averaged .0018, .0397 and .0231,
respectively, from February 1984 through December 1988.
































































































































































































































































































































Variances of Am, Az and Ak1
Variable 1973.1-1980.11 1980.12-1968.12 1980.12-1984.1 1964.2-1988.12 F2
1.731 1.576 1.641 1.554 1.1
am, 2.987 1 762 1 945 1.630 1.7~
Az, .022 .015 020 .012 1 5
.072 .023 .031 013 3.P
.063 .081 .085 .079 8
Observations Deleted
3
2046 1.414 866 1.624 1.4
.047 010 .006 008 4.7~
Ak 055 .078 .062 .085 7
‘Actual variance is 10’ limes the reported variance
2An F-statistic with an - indicates the hypothesis Ihat the variances of the variable are equal across the pre- and post-
MCA periods can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
2Observations were d&eted based on the tollowing rule: if the reserve requirement change took place on or before the
15th of the month, that month was deleted; if it took place after the 15th, the next month was deleled A close examina-
tion of deleted observations of Lm~ and bz~ with the corresponding dates ndicales that this rule performs reasonably
well.
fect of reserve-requirement changes on m~ and
to the usefulness of the monetary base adjust-
ment in capturing their effect. Furthermore, the
fact that these spikes are completely eliminated
after the phase-in of member banks confirms
the conclusion reached by the analysis of ZA and
; that extending reserve requirements to
nonmember banks and thrifts had a relatively
unimportant effect on the multiplier. With so
little variation in reserve ratios evident in z~
after February 1984, assessing the effect of the
move to CRA is difficult. Furthermore, the final
phase-in of the MCA for member banks coin-
cides closely with the adoption of CRA.
The Variability of the Multiplier
Because the levels of the multipliers, the cor-
responding z’s and the k-ratio have definite
trends, the variances of the levels are not very
useful as measures of variation. More appropri-
ate measures are the variances of the first dif-
ferences (A) of these variables.20
The variances of the first differences of the
multipliers, the z’s and the k-ratio for various
periods are presented in the upper part of table
1. This table also presents the F-statistic for a
test of the null hypothesis that the variances of
each series for the periods 1973.1-1980.11 and
1980.12-1988.12 are equal against the alternative
that the variance is larger during the earlier
period. These data show that the variance of
both AmA and Ani~declined following the adop-
tion of the MCA; however, only the decline for
Ani~is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. There is also a decrease in the variances
of AzA and A; following the adoption of the
MCA. Caution must be exercised in interpreting
the decline in the variance of AZA; it is biased
downward because of the elimination of the
ratio of reservable time deposits to checkable
20Diagnosfic tests indicate that mA, ms, ZA, 28 and k are
non-stationary n eve~s but staUonary in first differences.
Moreover, in most cases, the hypothesis that, in levels,
these series follow a random walk cannot be rejected at
the 5 percent level.
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Reserve Requirement Changes, 1973-88
Effective Date Reserve requirement change
June 21. 1973 The Board amended Is Regulation D to establish a marginal reserve requirement of 8 per-
cent against certain flme deposits and to subject to the 8 percent reserve requirement certain
deposits exempt from the rate limrlations of the Board’s Regulation Qi n addition, reserves
against certain foreign branch deposits were reduced from 10 percent to 8 percent. These
changes had !ittle effect on required reserves.
July 12. 1973 Reserve requirements were imposed against finance bills. This action rcreased required
reserves approximately $90 million
July 19. 1973 The reserve requirement against all net demand deposits, except the first $2 miNion was in.
creased 1/2 percentage point This acLion increased required reserves approximately $760
million.
October 4. 1973 The marginal reserve requirement against certain time deposits was increased from 8 percent
to 11 percent. This action increased reqwred reserves approximately $465 million
December 27. 1973 The marginal reserve requirement against certain lime deposits was reduced from ii percent
to 8 percent. This acUon reduced required reserves apprax;mately $360 million.
September 19. 1974 The marginal reserve requiremeni against time deposits in denomination greater than
$100,000 and more than four-month maturity was eliminated. This action reduced required
reserves approximately $510 million.
December 12. 1974 The reserve requirement against all time deposits with an original maturity of six months or
longer was reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent, the reserve requirement against all lime
deposits with an original maturity of less than six months was increased from 5 percent to 6
percent; and the reserve requirement against net demand deposits more than $400 million
was reduced from 18 percenl Ia 17-1/2 percent. In addition, the 3 percent marginal reserve
requirement on large cerlilucates of deposit with an initial maturity of less than four months
was removed. These actions reduced required reserves approximately $710 million
February 13. 1975 Trie reserve requirements against all categories of net demand deposits up to $400 million
were reduced by one-half of 1 percentage point, and the reserve requirement against net de-
mand deposits of more than $400 million was reduced 1 percentage point. This action re-
duced required reserves approximately $1,065 million.
May 22. 1975 The reserve requirement against for&gn borrowings of member banks, primarily Eurodollars.
was reduced from 8 percent to 4 percent. This action reduced requfred reserves approximate-
ly $80 million.
October 30. 1975 The reserve requirement against member bank time deposits with an original maturity of Jour
years or more was reduced from 3 percent to 1 percent. This action reduced required
reserves approximately $360 milltn
January 8. 1976 The reserve requirement on time deposits maturing in 180 days to 4 years was reduced Irom
3 percent to 2-1/2 percent This action reduced required reserves by approximately $500
million.
December 30 1976 The reserve requ:rement against net demand deposits up to $10 million was reduced by 1/2
percentage poini. and the reserve requirement aga!nst net dernaric deposits more than $10
miHian was reduced by 1/4 percentage point Th s action reduced required reserves by ap-
proximately $550 milhon.
Novembor 2. 1978 A supplementary reserve requirement of 2 percentage points was imposed on time deposits
ol $100,000 or more Th:s aclion increased required reserves approximately $30 bilI’on45
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Reserve Requirement Changes, 1973-88
Effective Date Reserve requirement change
March 4, 1982 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of member banks decreased by about $2 0 billion.
May 13, 1982 In conjunctron with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act re-
quired reserves of certain nonmember banks and foreign-related institutions increased about
$150 million.
August 12. 1982 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of certain nonmember banks and foreign-related institutions increased about
$140 million
September 2, 1982 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of member banks were reduced about $2.1 billion. and required reserves of
other depository institutions were increased about $0.9 billion,
October 28, 1982 In accordance with provisions of the Depository Institutions Act of 1982, required reserves of
certain former member banks were reduced by approximately $100 million.
December 23. 1982 Ii, accordance with provisions of the Depository Institutions Act of 1982 that exempted the
first $2 1 million of reservable liabilities at all depository institutions from reserve re-
quirements, required reserves were reduced by an estimated $800 miflion.
March 3, 1983 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of member banks were reduced by approximately $1.9 billion,
April 14, 1983 Required reserves were reduced an estimated $80 milhon as a result of the elimination of
reserve requirements on nonpersonal limo deposits with maturities of 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 years.
September 1, 1983 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of member banks were reduced about $2 C billion, and required reserves of
other depository institutions were increased about $0 9 billion.
October 20. 1983 Required reserves were reduced an estimated $100 million as a result of (he elimination of
reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits with maturities of 1-1/210 2-1/2 years.
January 12, 1984 The low reserve tranche for transaction accounts at depository instiIut~ons was raised from
$26.3 million to $28.9 million. Also. in accordance with the provisions of the Depository In-
stitutions Act of 1982, the reserve requirement exemption applied to total reservable I~ahiIities
was raised from S2.1 million to $2.2 million These actions reduced required reserves by
about $350 million
February 2 1984 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, re-
quired reserves of member banks were reduced about $2.0 billion
September 13, 1984 In conjunction with the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act re-
quired reserves of certain nonmember depository rnstflutions ncreased about $1.08 billion.
January 3. 1985 The law-reserve tranche for transaction accounts was raised from $289 million [0 $298
tmllion The exemption applied to reservable liabdities was also raised from $22 mill~onto
$2.4 million These actions reduced required reserves by about $190 mUlti
September 12, 1985 According to the transitional phase-in program under the Monetary Control Act, required
reserves of certain nonmernber depository institulions were increased about $1.23 b~lJion
January 2. 1986 The low-reserve tranche br transaction accounts was raised from $298 million cc 531 7
million The exemption applied to reservable liabilities was also raisec from $24 rn.llion to
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deposits from m~.Care must also be taken in
interpreting the decline in the variance of Az~
because reserve’requirement changes affect that
variance in an indeterminate way. To remove
the effect of reserve-requirement changes, the
variances of Am~,Az~and Ak were recalculated
from smaller samples in which observations for
months affected by the reserve-requirement
changes were deleted, These variances are
presented in the bottom portion of table 1. The
list of reserve requirement changes from Jan-
uary 1973 through December 1988 is presented
in table 2,21 The results show a large, though
not statistically significant, decline in the vari~
ance of Am~and a large and stalistically signifi.
cant decline in the variance of ~ Hence,
while it is clear that reserve.requirement
changes had a substantial effect on the vari-
ances of Am~and Az~,these changes do not
seem to qualitatively affect the observed impact
of the MCA.
The variance of Ak increased slightly, but not
significantly so over these periods. Hence, it
would appear that the observed reduction in
the variances of AmA and Am~can be attributed
to the predicted reduction in the variances of
AZA and Az~.This is not necessarily the case,
however. The variance of Am is given by an ex-
pression like
(4) Var’(Am) = a2Var(Ak) + bzVar(Az) —
ZabCov(Ak,Az),
where Var and Coy denote the variance and
covariance of the variables in parentheses,
respectively. Because the coefficients, a and b,
change with the MCA and the adoption of CRA,
ills impossible to say that the observed decline
in the variance of ~m is due solely to the de-
cline in the variance of Az. A clearer picture of
the effects of the MCA and the adoption of CRA
on the variance of Am can be obtained by calcu-
lating the proportion of the variance of Am ac-
21Reserve-reqthrement changes trot-n 1960 to 1973 can be
found n Burger (1979), pp. 6-7.
22As expected, the variance of Az~from the sample in which
observations affected by reserve-requirement changes
were deleted is substanfially smaller than that from the full
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counted for by each component on the right-
hand side of equation 4.
These proportions for the relevant periods are
presented in table 3. For both multipliers, the
proportion of the variance of Am explained by
the Az component declines after November 1980,
while the proportion of the variance explained
by the Ak component rises. Furthermore, the
decline in the proportion of the variance of the
change in the multiplier explained by the Az
component continues after the adoption of CRA.
This latter observation is not necessarily evi-
dence that the move to CRA reduced the vari-
ability of the multiplier; however, the comple-
tion of the MCA phase-in for member banks
coincides closely with the adoption of CRA.
CONCLUSION
The changes in reserve requirements specified
by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
switch to contemporaneous reserve accounting
in February 1984 imply that the link between
Ml and the monetary base should have become
tighter in the 1980s. The empirical evidence
presented in this article suggests that, in fact,
the money-base relationship has strengthened in
the sense that, for a given k-ratio, the multiplier
has become less variable.
By eliminating or, at least, diminishing the im-
portance of some sources of variability in the
multiplier, these changes have potentially
enhanced the Federal Reserves control over
Ml. The degree to which control over Ml has
improved, however, hinges on how these
changes, among others, have affected the
predictability of the multiplier.23 The slight
reduction in the variance of the change in the
multiplier in the 1980s does not necessarily imp-
ly thai the multiplier itself is easier to predict.
The evidence presented in this article suggests
that the predictability of the multiplier, especial-
23See Johannes and Rasche (1979) and Hater and Hem
(1983) for a discussion of the controt problem for Ml arid
how itis related to the Feds ability to forecast the money
multiplier. Johannes and Rasche (1987) argue that their
money stock control model performs well during the
1950s.
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model of the money supply process. This model
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the money supply process. It is not intended to





= RR~+ ER + C,
(3) RH1
= r~[CD?y + CD1(1-y)] + F1 TR~+
r~GD
(4) ER~= a[CD~ + dICDV + GD~+ I3CD~T
+ ~ (TD, — 6
1
CD)]y
+ a(CD1 + 62 CD + GDJ (1—y)
(5) TD~ = dCDy + d2CIJ~(1 --y), O~>
(6) TD = TD~ + TDN~
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1FQV example, the model does not account explicitly for the
fact that required reserves under both LRA and CRA con-
sist of cieposfts at the Federal Reserve plus vault cash
held during the two weeks prior to the current reserve
maintenance period. Since the impact of the variabiflty of
changes in vault cash is the same under all regimes, ac-
counting for this fact would merely add another random
component to afl of the reduced-form expressions; so t
does not qualitatively affect the conclusions. The same
concIus~onholds for Eurodollar deposits and trav&er’s
checks, which are also not explicitly treated in the model.
ly that for the source base, depends crucially on
the predictability of the k-ratio in the 1980s- In
any case, further research is necessary to deter-
mine whether predicting the multiplier has
become more or less difficult.
von Hagen, Ju?~en.“Money Stock Targeting with Afternative
Reserve Requirement Systems,” Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts-
und Sozia!wissenschaften (1987), pp. 379-95.
(7) CD, = CD~+ CD~
(8) CD~’ = OCD,
(9) Ct = kCIJ,
(10) TD =
(11) GD~= gCD1
The superscripts, M and N, distinguish depos-
its held at member depository institutions from
those held at nonmember institutions. (Nonmem-
ber institutions include both banks and thrifts).
The superscripts R and NH distinguish reser-
vable from nonreservable time and savings
deposits. The variable names are:
C = the currency component of the money
stock
CD = checkable deposits
TI) = time and savings deposits
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GD = government deposits
SB = source base, currency plus total reserves
RR = required reserves
ER = excess reserves
Ml = the Ml definition of the money stock
= reserve requirement ratio on reservable
checkable deposits
reserve requirement ratio on reservable
savings and time deposits
y is a shift parameter with the characteristic,
1 before November 1930
— 0 after November 1980
The reserve requirement ratios, re and rT, and
the coefficients, J3 and t~ are assumed to be
fixed parameters, whereas the ratios, 6, k, A, 6,
62? g and a, are treated as independent random
variables with time-invariant (stationary) distri-
butions.
These equations establish the relationship be-
tween the monetary base and Ml and the fea-
tures of the MCA that have altered that rela-
tionship. In the context of this static model,
there are two distinct regimes: before the MCA,
y = 1; and, after the MCA, y= 0. Equation 1 is
simply the current definition of Ml, currency
plus checkable deposits, including demand de-
posits and NOW accounts. Equation 2 defines
the uses of source base as the sum of required
and excess reserves and currency held by the
nonbank public.
Equation 3 specifies required reserves in the
pre-MCA period (y= 1) and under MCA (y=O).
Before the MCA, reserves were required to be
held against checkable deposits and savings and
time deposits at member banks, as well as total
government deposits. Equation 5 says that, prior
to the MCA, reservable time and savings
deposits were a fraction, d~,of checkable
deposits. Equation 5 defines that class, under
the MCA, to be a smaller fraction of checkable
deposits, d~,where d~> d~.Equation 4 de-
scribes excess reserve holdings by all depository
institutions under both regimes and is general
enough to capture the possibility that
nonmember banks acted as if.they were subject
to reserve requirements. Specifically, if
= a ±r~and ~ = a ±~‘T
then member and nonmember banks acted
identically before and after the MCA.
Equation 6 is an identity for total time and
savings deposits. Similarly, equation 7i san
identity for total checkable deposits. Equations 8
through 11 establish proportional links of
checkable deposits at member banks, currency,
total time and savings deposits and government
deposits, respectively, to total checkable
deposits.
Equations 1 through 11 are general enough to
show the potential impact of the MCA on the
multiplier. A dynamic specification, however, is
necessary to illustrate the possible effects of the
switch from LRA to CRA. Introducing a dynam-
ic element into the model can be accomplished
easily by substituting the following equations
for equations 3 and 5:
(3’) RH1
= r~CD~ y+r~CD~1 (l—y)(l--tp)
+ r~CD1ip + r~TDf~
+ r~GD, (1—tp)+ r~GD~tp
(5’) TIJ~= d~CD~.I y + 62CDt~J(1—y)(1---tp)
+ d2CD~ip
where ip= 0 under LRA and tp = 1 under CRA.
The Effects of the MCA
The multipliers (denoted by rn), linking Ml to
the source base in the static framework for the





where A a(O + + g + fl(1 -0) + ~ (A - 6))
+ r~(9-i- g) + + k
(lZb)m = ____
B
where B a(1 + 62 +g )+r~(1+g )
++ k
The impact of the MCA on the multiplier can
be seen partly by comparing the expressions in
12. First, notice that the ratio of checkable de-
posits at member banks to total checkable de-
posits, d, does not influence the multiplier
under the MCA. Second, the parameters that
capture the nonmember banks preferences for
holding excess reserves disappear from the
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multiplier under the MCA. If, however, non-
member banks held reserves as if they were
member banks, deposit shifts between member
and nonmember banks would not have been a
source of variability in the multiplier. Never-
theless, even in this case, the MCA would have
affected the multiplier because of the MCA’s
reclassification of reservable time deposits. Tt’h!s
new classification means that 62 replaces 6 and
A in the multiplier under the MCA regime.
To see how the MCA affected the variability
of the multiplier, we can compare the variances
of m expressed in equations 12a and tab. By us-
ing a Taylor’s series expansion to approximate
the variances of m before the MCA, one can
verify the following:
(13) Var (m) = (8m\~
1J 1J 8
\ak/ \ao1





























and of denotes the constant variance of the ran-
dom variable j. This approximation assumes that
the covariances between the random variables
is Ii
Similarly, we can approximate the variance of
the multiplier under MCA:






Comparing equations 13 and 14 reveals that
some sources of variation present before the
MCA are no longer relevant—namely, ü~,
and 02A. Variability of the ratios of time deposits
at member banks to total checkable deposits
and total time deposits to total checkable depos-
its does not contribute to the variance of the
multiplier under the MCiI. The MCA, however,
does maintain reserve requirements on some
time deposits, represented here by OZCDV Ac-
cordingly, variability in the ratio of these
deposits to total checkable deposits essentially
represents a new source of variation in the
multiplier under MCA.
The MCA had another important effect on the
variance of the multiplier. In particular, by
changing the level of the multiplier, it changed
the coefficients on each of the individual vari-
ances. The multiplier in the MCA regime will be
unambiguously larger than in the pre-MCA
regime if, before the adoption of the MCA, non-
member banks acted identically to member
banks—that is, if J3 = ¶±ic and ~ =
As /3 and ~ approach 0, the difference in the
multipliers for the two regimes gets smaller.
But, provided that (d~ — d~) (~T + a) > (1 —6) (r0 +a),
B < A and the multiplier is larger under MCA.
That is, if the impact of eliminating reserve
requirements on a ]arge class of time and
savings deposits is greater than the effect of
extending reserve requirements to all depos-
















larger in the current regime than in the pre-
MCA regime.2
That the multiplier can be larger under MCA
implies that the sources of variability remaining
under MCA can make a greater contribution to
the variability of the multiplier. Even under the
simplifying assumption that the magnitudes of
the remaining sources of variability do not
change across regimes, the variance of the
multiplier could be larger under the current
regime. Although it is highly unlikely that the
variance would increase, the variability in ki s
likely to have a greater impact on the variance
of the multiplier under MCA than in the pro-
MCA regime.
The Effects of the Move to CRA
from LIL’l
To investigate the possible effects of the
switch to CRA from LRA, we employ the dy-
namic version of the model. In the dynamic
model, there are three regimes of interest: pre-
MCA, LIlA (y=l, tp=O); MCA, LRA (y=O, w=OL
and, MCA, CBA (y=O, tp= 1). The contemporane-
ous multipliers in the dynamic model for these




where A’Ha a[O + 6 + g + /3(1—B)
+ ~ (A - d)] + k
(15h) m =
11
where W a(1 + 62 + g) + k
(lSc) ru =
C-
where Ce a(1+d,-4-g)+r~(1+g)+r~d2 + k
Before discussing the effects of the move to
CRA, we can see how the MCA influenced the
multiplier under LRA by comparing iSa with
15b. As in the static model, the random ratio of
checkable deposits at member banks to total
checkable deposits and the fixed parameters,
describing the behavior of nonrnember banks’
holdings of excess reserves prior to MCA, are
no longer relevant for the multiplier in the
MCA/LRA regime. Also, the MCA influences the
level of the multiplier in an analytically indeter-
minant way.
The move to CR\ unambiguously decreased
the average level of the multiplier, however, as
can be seen by inspecting equations lSb and
15c. Nevertheless, the net effect from the first
to the third regimes predicted by the dynamic
model is identical to that predicted by the staUc
model. That IS, holding all else constant, the
level of the multiplier is most likely higher now
than before the MCA if the net effect of the
MCA was to decrease average reserve
requirements.
In fact, the dynamic version of the model of
the money supply process has similar predic-
tions about the impact of the MCA on the
variability of the multiplier to those from the
static model. The similarities of the predictions
of both models can be verified by approxima-
ting the variance of the multipliers expressed in
15 with a Taylor’s series expansion. Since the
multiplier declines from the second to the third
regimes, variation in k and a provide smaller
contributions to the variability of the multiplier
upon the move to CRA. The change in the im-
portance of the variability of 62 and g for the
variability of the multiplier could be smaller,
but is likely to be larger. Nonetheless, the pre-
dicted effect of the MCA on the variability of
the multipliers and its components from the
first to the third regimes in the dynamic model
is qualitatively identical to the effect predicted
by the static model.~Specifically, the variance of
the multiplier should fall with the implementa-
tion of the MCA and the switch to CRA.
2As discussed in the main text but not captured in this sim-
ple model, if the effect of reducing reserve requirements
on checkable deposits h&d at many member banks is
large, the adoption ofthe MCA wou~dtend to increase the
multipher.
3As Thornton (1983) shows, the isolated impact of the move
to CRA on the mufliplier is diminished if depository institu-
tions hold excess reserves as a buffer stock to absorb
changes in required reserves under CRA, a possibility not
captured by the dynamic model. To the extent that these
institutions hold excess reserves as a buffer stock, the
switch from LRA to CRA has a smaller effect on the
dynamic structure of the money supp~yprocess. Further,
one can veñfy, by setting nO, that the move to CRA
could have ncreased the variabiHty of the rnuffiplier if,
under LRA, the only contemporaneous Unk between the
monetary base and Ml were through currency holdings.
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